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Germany’s Post-Reunification Effort to Achieve 
National Reconciliation: Muddling Through, 
Routinization, and Policy Failure*
Jörg Michael Dostal
This article reexamines the track record of German unification after 
three decades. The focus is placed on economic issues, while cultural, 
social, and geopolitical dimensions are dealt with more briefly. 
Following the introduction, Section II briefly examines the history of 
Germany’s national division and the East German political events in late 
1989 and early 1990 that produced the unification of the two Germanies 
on 3 October 1990. Sections III to V subsequently discuss the major 
political and economic events during the Kohl, Schröder, and Merkel 
Chancellorships, respectively. Section III focuses on the high political 
and social costs of the initial economic disruption in the East due to the 
near single-minded focus on the rapid privatization of the former GDR 
enterprises. In Section IV, the negative feedback of the economic shock is 
discussed, namely high unemployment, the fiscal crisis of the welfare 
state, and the demographic collapse in the East. Section V sketches how 
the Great Recession of 2007-2008, the subsequent Euro currency, and the 
southern EU states’ debt crises collectively crowded out the topic of 
intra-German reconciliation. The emerging overall picture advanced in 
Section VI is that a combination of muddling through, routinization 
(here also termed as “reconciliation by accident”), and policy failure 
most adequately describes the outcome of Germany’s unification 
experience. Finally, Section VII puts forward some policy suggestions for 
Korean audiences deriving from the German case. It is argued that the 
geopolitical situation of the two Koreas is fundamentally different. Thus, 
South Korea’s main focus must be placed on patient inter-Korean 
engagement, focusing on conflict prevention while also engaging with 
all relevant external stakeholders.
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I. Introduction
Reviewing three decades of German unification means highlighting 
that German citizens in the former Western state (the Federal Republic of 
Germany, or FRG) and the former Eastern state (the German Democratic 
Republic, or GDR) continue to strongly disagree on whether the 
unification process should be evaluated as a success, ambivalent 
experience, or an overall failure. Every native German author on the 
topic speaks ultimately as a member of a particular age cohort and is 
influenced by personal memories, past and current political views, and, 
in the case of the more mature age groups, one’s earlier West German or 
East German citizenship. Very soon, one can certainly expect a flood of 
new analysis around 3 October 2020, the 30th anniversary of what is 
termed Wiedervereinigung (“reunification”) in the German language. In 
Germany, this event will be celebrated by some and ignored by many. To 
be sure, the analytical time frame of three decades is long enough to 
draw certain conclusions from past experiences. By now, one must 
accept certain outcomes as final results. To put it in the words of the 2001 
Nobel Prize for Literature winner V. S. Naipaul: “There could be no 
going back; there was nothing to go back to. We had become what the 
world outside had made us; we had to live in the world as it existed.”1  
The current article makes an effort to highlight certain “ideal-
typical” approaches and interpretations that are prominent in current-
day Germany concerning the unification experience. The author does 
not necessarily share any of the presented views in their entirety. 
Instead, the purpose here is to adopt the position of an honest broker in 
communicating some German experiences to a Korean and perhaps 
Asian audience. In order to do so, the following order of presentation 
will be adopted: (I) the period of German division since 1949 and the 
events of 1989/90 that resulted in the unification on 3 October 1990; (II) 
the period of the Helmut Kohl Chancellorship concerning post-
unification Germany between late 1990 and 1998; (III) the period of the 
1 V. S. Naipaul, A Bend in the River (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 244.
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Gerhard Schröder Chancellorship between 1998 and 2005; (IV) the 
period of the Angela Merkel Chancellorship since 2005; (V) some 
conclusions from the German experience; and (VI) potential policy-
making lessons for Korean and other non-German audiences. Each 
section will present a brief account of major events and policy initiatives 
followed by an evaluation of the outcomes.
II. Germany’s Division and the Events of 1989/90
Briefly, the division of Germany into two states belonging to 
opposite Cold War “blocs” (U.S.-led and Soviet-led) was one of the 
outcomes of the Second World War. The initial policy of the conservative 
West German governments toward East Germany since 1949 focused on 
the principle of non-recognition of the GDR and a “policy of strength” 
indicating the absence of any official dialogue with the other side. 
Following the 1969 West German federal election, the newly incoming 
center-left and reformist government of Social Democratic Chancellor 
Willy Brandt (the so-called “social-liberal” coalition made up of Social 
Democrats (SPD) and Liberals (FDP)) started focusing on improving 
relations with the GDR and the Soviet Union. This strategic initiative 
was termed the “New Eastern Policy” (Neue Ostpolitik).
The very first protagonist of this new approach was the Social 
Democratic politician and intra-German “fixer” Egon Bahr (SPD). Bahr’s 
portfolio of activities in the 1960s combined a formal role as spokesman 
and leading assistant of the then West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt with 
the informal role of cultivating close relationships with top U.S. and 
Soviet policy advisers. Bahr termed the new strategic paradigm, 
indicating political engagement with East Germany, as “change through 
rapprochement” (Wandel durch Annäherung) in a speech delivered in 
mid-1963.2 Beyond improving the intra-German relationship, the policy 
2 For the full text of the speech, see Egon Bahr, “Wandel durch Annäherung” (paper 
presented at the Evangelische Akademie Tutzing, July 15, 1963), <https://web.ev-
akademie-tutzing.de/cms/fileadmin/content/Die%20Akademie/Geschichte/Wandel/
Wandeldurchannaeherung.pdf> (date accessed November 18, 2019).
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was also intended to cultivate West Germany’s relationship with Poland 
and the Soviet Union.3 The Bahr approach, later implemented by Brandt, 
was successful in the sense that dialogue between the two Germanies as 
well as the FRG and the Soviet Union continued throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s in spite of a period of worsening Cold War tensions between 
the two opposing superpowers.
Regardless of such diplomatic initiatives, however, most West and 
East Germans did not expect any unification of the two states to occur 
during their lifetime. In fact, the most popular German word to 
subsequently describe the events of 1989 and 1990 is “die Wende,” which 
translates as “the turning point” (in a political sense) and indicates the 
sudden miracle-like break-up of the previous fixed state of European 
and global affairs founded on German division. In order to understand 
how “the turning point” occurred, one must first focus on global and 
regional factors. On the global level, the Soviet Union-led alliance of 
states had run into deep structural economic problems, some of them 
related to deteriorations in the Soviet Union’s balance of trade due to a 
decline in oil and gas prices in the 1980s that strongly affected the Soviet 
Union’s external revenue. 
The appointment of Mikhail S. Gorbachev as General Secretary of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985 and as first and, as it 
turned out, last President of the Soviet Union in 1990 resulted in the 
abandonment of the “Brezhnev Doctrine,” namely the Soviet 
leadership’s announcement that it would not hesitate to resort to 
military force to break up any internal unrest in an aligned country. 
During the 1980s, the wave of working-class strikes and the rise of an 
independent trade union movement in Poland already questioned the 
durability of Eastern European state-socialist regimes. Most of all, the 
Gorbachev period was characterized by announcements of honesty, 
transparency, and a renewal of socialism. However, these promises 
turned sour when what was at the time referred to as the “nationality 
3 For details of the “New Eastern Policy,” see Jörg Michael Dostal, “Two Koreas, one 
Germany: Is the German Unification Experience becoming more relevant for today’s 
Koreas?,” (Seoul National University Asia Center, Diverse Asia Online Series, vol. 1, no. 2, 
2018), <http://diverseasia.snu.ac.kr/?p=1324> (date accessed November 18, 2019). 
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question” increasingly threatened the viability of the Soviet Union’s 
federalist framework. More and more national independence 
movements demanded secession from the Union and from Russia as the 
actual backbone of Soviet statehood.
The dramatic decline of the bargaining position of the Soviet Union 
vis-à-vis the Western powers opened the door for the events of 1989 and 
1990 in the GDR and the other Soviet-aligned Eastern European states. It 
must be stressed that there still exists no full consensus about what 
actually occurred in 1989 and 1990. The view of events put forward by 
today’s German government is that a “peaceful revolution” introduced 
democracy, liberal pluralism, and the rule of law in the East. In turn, the 
subsequent German unification is understood as the accession of the 
GDR joining the FRG based on the self-dissolution of the former and the 
introduction of the societal norms of the latter.4 In a similar manner, East 
German events were also described as a “catch-up revolution” based on 
the GDR society’s joining of the economically more developed and 
culturally more diverse Western way of life. The same author suggested 
that this particular type of revolution had nothing to offer on its own, 
stressing a “near-total lack of innovative ideas pointing to the future.”5 
However, such homogenizing narratives continue to be questioned 
by many of the East German participants in the events of 1989 and 1990 
4 Gerhard A. Ritter, “The Social Policy of Unification and Its Consequences for the 
Transformation of the Economy in the New Eastern States,” in The East German 
Economy, 1945-2010. Falling Behind or Catching Up?, eds., Hartmut Berghoff and Uta 
Andrea Balbier (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 217-31. 
5 Jürgen Habermas, Die nachholende Revolution (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1990), p. 181. 
All translations from German sources are by the author. It could be argued, however, that 
Habermas failed to credit the emergence of the so-called “round tables” (Runde Tische), 
bringing together the representatives of the GDR government and opposition in late 1989 
and early 1990 at the GDR-national, regional, and municipal levels for direct talks on all 
major policymaking issues, as a potentially promising form of deliberative democracy. 
The round tables increased the number of stakeholders and offered GDR citizens 
unprecedentedly high levels of transparency. In fact, the current author clearly remembers 
the GDR’s political atmosphere in late 1989 and early 1990, when the old state had lost 
all authority and no new institutions had yet been formed. During this liminal period 
everyday life continued as normal, as a short-term realized utopia in which citizens for a 
brief moment negotiated their affairs as equals. 
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who still remember the dramatic shifts in political leadership happening 
between October 1989 and March 1990. In a matter of weeks, sometimes 
days, the political profile of the GDR protests changed again and again. 
The starting point was the hope to reform the GDR from within, which 
included frequent reference to a renewal of socialism. In subsequent 
stages, especially after the opening of the intra-German border on 9 
November 1989, the initial actors and their demands were pushed aside 
by new actors demanding economic and political equalization with West 
Germany and the self-dissolution of the GDR. Even in the latter stages, 
many East Germans still expected that intra-German negotiations were 
required to equitably agree on terms and conditions of unification. Only 
weeks before the decisive elections of 18 March 1990, which sealed the 
political fate of the GDR by handing electoral triumph to the center-right 
CDU, the opinion polls had suggested that the SPD was on course to 
win the majority of East German votes. Moreover, many East Germans 
believed that there would be deliberation about a new German 
constitution in the event of unification. This debate never happened, 
however, and a draft constitution written by GDR reformers was 
shelved without any further discussion in April 1990.6 The remainder of 
this section discusses different phases of the 1989 and 1990 events in 
detail. 
Initially, public protests in the GDR were organized and attended by 
the so-called “civic activists” (Bürgerbewegte) who demanded a reformed 
GDR society based on democracy, human rights, and transparency. This 
group of activists included only a couple hundred people across the 
GDR and was under the close supervision of the GDR security services. 
The protesters did not expect to bring down the state but wanted to 
reform the GDR society from within. Joining the initially small rallies 
and demanding the recognition and legalization of civic activist circles 
by the GDR authorities was an act of genuine courage.
Due to the relative openness of the GDR to external media 
6 “Entwurf Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,” Arbeitsgruppe 
“Neue Verfassung der DDR” des Runden Tisches, Berlin, April 1990, <http://www.
documentarchiv.de/ddr/1990/ddr-verfassungsentwurf_runder-tisch.html> (date 
accessed November 18, 2019).
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commentary—West German TV was available to most GDR citizens—
the civic activists became broadly known to GDR citizens. In parallel, the 
opening of the “Iron Curtain” in Hungary since 2 May 1989 allowed 
many GDR citizens to leave their country via Hungary to start a new life 
in the FRG. Last but not least, the GDR leadership faced a severe 
economic and political crisis. The tipping point proved to be the 40th 
anniversary of the GDR’s founding on 7 October. Official celebrations 
became overshadowed by street rallies and skirmishes between 
protesters and the GDR police force in East Berlin. Subsequently, the 
leadership of the East German “leading” political force, the Socialist 
Unity Party (abbreviated SED in German) was exchanged. The new SED 
leadership quickly decided that they would not use the police or army to 
attack the protest rallies. Briefly thereafter, the SED’s rank-and-file, and 
especially the party’s intellectuals, also started their own street protests 
demanding reform of GDR socialism.7 
Broadly speaking, the second stage of events was led by pro-GDR 
intellectuals advocating for new efforts to create a humanistic socialism. 
On 4 November 1989, a large rally was organized in the central 
Alexanderplatz Square in East Berlin during which around one million 
people listened to speeches of representatives of East German society 
mostly drawn from the cultural sphere. The speakers overwhelmingly 
demanded internal renewal of the GDR. This event was followed three 
weeks later by an appeal by the East German novelist Christa Wolf and 
other pro-socialist GDR intellectuals titled “For our country” (this meant 
the GDR), which called for “a socialist alternative to the FRG.”8 
However, such reform efforts quickly fell by the wayside due to the 
shock announcement by a GDR government spokesman, on 9 
November, that the borders between East and West Berlin would be 
immediately opened. Due to this unexpected event, quickly followed by 
the opening of all intra-German borders, the future of GDR statehood 
was cast in doubt—not least because Western political actors could now 
7 Sabine Pannen, Wo ein Genosse ist, da ist die Partei! Der innere Zerfall der SED-
Parteibasis 1979-1989 (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 2018), pp. 44, 300.
8 “Für unser Land,” November 26, 1989, <https://www.ddr89.de/texte/land.html> (date 
accessed November 18, 2019).
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directly engage with eastern events on the ground.
In the third stage of events, the hopes of the GDR intellectuals were 
crushed. While workers (and peasants) were notionally the ruling social 
classes of the GDR, they had in reality always been “represented” by the 
SED as the “leading party,” which included a strong overrepresentation 
of intellectuals. It turned out that the intellectuals, still broadly 
supportive of socialist ideas, were alienated from many members of the 
social class on whose behalf they advocated socialism.9 Once the GDR 
working class joined the rallies in large numbers, the main rally slogan 
turned from “We are the people” to “We are one people.” This was 
particularly noticeable in the Leipzig street rallies when, in November 
1989, calls for an “end of [socialist] experiments” and the unification of 
the GDR with the FRG grew louder while leftist groups appeared 
isolated. This turned out to be the decisive “tipping point” of the events. 
Those who still favored the reform of the GDR from within would 
subsequently refer to the rapid shift in rally slogans as the “turning point 
of the turning point” (die Wende der Wende), namely the political 
demands now became focused on joining the FRG and abandoning 
GDR culture and identity as quickly as possible. 
In the fourth and final stage of events, the public rallies became 
dominated by the preparation of the first (and last) free GDR national 
elections in March 1990. Heavily subsidized by West German political 
funding, the so-called “Alliance for Germany,” a right-of-center coalition 
of the East German Christian Democrats (CDU) with two smaller 
political groups, and indirectly led by the FRG Chancellor and West 
German CDU chief Helmut Kohl, easily gained the largest vote share of 
48 percent based on the promise of rapid unification after the shortest 
possible transition period. The Social Democrats were soundly defeated 
with around 22 percent of the vote while the former GDR state party 
SED, now renamed the “Party of Democratic Socialism” (PDS), gained a 
respectable 16 percent. All other political forces, especially the citizens’ 
circles that had organized the initial rallies, failed to make major inroads 
9 Mario Keβler, “DDR Historiker – Akteure und Chronisten,” Das Blättchen, vol. 22, 
no. 18 (2019), <https://das-blaettchen.de/2019/08/ddr-historiker-%e2%80%93-
akteure-und-chronisten-49389.html> (date accessed November 18, 2019).
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in the election. In December 1990, two months after unification, the first 
federal election of unified Germany took place and Kohl defeated the 
SPD candidate Oskar Lafontaine, who had earlier voiced reservations 
about the quick speed of unification due to the vast economic differences 
between the Western and Eastern economies. The next section outlines 
the major policies that were taken since March and October 1990 and in 
the remainder of the Kohl Chancellorship until 1998.
III. Unification and Kohl Chancellorship (1990-1998)
Practically all significant path-making decisions concerning the 
economic and political features of the unification process were 
introduced under the Kohl government in 1990 and briefly thereafter. 
The starting point was that “unification” did not mean a political 
marriage of equals. Rather, the GDR with nearly 17 million citizens 
“joined” the FRG with around 61 million citizens, giving up all 
bargaining power in the hope of good treatment by the new authorities. 
Many critics rejected the term “unification” and instead suggested that 
the process should be called a “take-over” (“Anschluss” or “Übernahme”) 
of the GDR by the FRG. The Western political, economic, and legal 
systems, national symbols and the de-facto Constitution, the 
Grundgesetz, were expanded to incorporate East Germany. 
In early 1990, an economic trust body (the “Treuhandanstalt”) was 
founded by the GDR government to deal with the Eastern enterprise 
structure, which subsequently, after the victory of the CDU-led center-
right election alliance in the GDR-wide elections of March 1990, was 
tasked to privatize around 8500 state-owned GDR enterprises with more 
than 4 million employees. One major reason for the victory of the CDU-
led election alliance was that the Kohl government had promised before 
the March election to quickly introduce the West German currency (the 
DM) in the East. This was considered to be inevitable in order to avoid 
large-scale migration of Eastern workers to West Germany. Conversely, 
the introduction of the West German currency also meant that GDR 
enterprises lost the ability to compete under market conditions with 
10 Jörg Michael Dostal
Western companies due to the much lower labor productivity in the 
East.10
The Treuhandanstalt came under the full jurisdiction of the Kohl 
government once the GDR ceased to exist on 3 October 1990. This, in 
effect, meant the disappearance of any kind of separate East German 
institutional veto. Contrary to some other state socialist societies in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, there was no pretense to distribute 
ownership shares of state enterprise among GDR citizens. Instead, GDR 
firms and industry were supposed to be privatized by the 
Treuhandanstalt as quickly as possible in line with the concepts of 
economic “shock therapy.”11 In fact, most Eastern enterprises were 
quickly closed down due to their lower productivity compared to 
Western companies. The consumer market of the former GDR was 
flooded with West German products and services crowding out 
remaining Eastern producers. From mid-1990, unemployment started to 
grow very quickly. Thus, GDR citizens no longer had time for 
philosophical debates about an ideal society, but were instead forced to 
reorganize their personal lives and relationships under the new 
conditions of a market society. This meant that people’s ability to have 
second thoughts about what was going on was effectively blocked 
since they quickly became overwhelmed by the dramatic societal 
transformations.
In terms of describing the major events, one might distinguish in 
order of importance the policy paradigms informing the economic 
transition (most important), the policy instruments used to implement 
these paradigms (second-most important), and the instrument settings 
of each policy instrument (least important and most easily 
changeable).12 The major policy paradigm was to rapidly privatize the 
10 Ritter, op. cit., pp. 220-23.
11 Andreas Pickel, “The Jump-Started Economy and the Ready-Made State: A Theoretical 
Reconsideration of the East German Case,” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 30, no. 2 
(1997), pp. 211-41.
12 For this typology of policy change, see Peter A. Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning 
and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain,” Comparative Politics, 
vol. 25, no. 3 (1993), pp. 275-96.
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GDR economy at all costs. The second paradigm was to return real 
estate and enterprises that had been expropriated by the GDR since the 
1950s to their former private owners, or their descendants, who mostly 
resided in West Germany. This principle of “compulsory return of 
property titles” extended to all assets that had not been subject to the 
immediate post-WW2 expropriations of war criminals by the Soviet 
occupying authorities. A second qualification was that the results of land 
reform directly after WW2, in 1945 and 1946, namely the expropriation 
of large landowners and those closely linked with the Nazi regime, were 
to be respected. Thus, land titles were not in all cases returned to their 
former owners. Nevertheless, the policy produced an unexpected return 
of East German assets to West German former owners, or their 
descendants, who were now reunited with properties that they had 
never previously expected to reclaim.
The rapid decision-making on the disposal of GDR state enterprise 
was supposed to inflict the least amount of pain and deliver the quickest 
possible economic turnaround. In reality, it resulted in a giveaway of 
assets since many West German corporations purchased potential East 
German competitors only to close them down.13 In most cases, a slower 
speed of privatization would have allowed more adequate preparation 
of GDR enterprises so that they could survive under market conditions. 
However, such views were disregarded and the Treuhandanstalt 
implemented quick privatization before being closed down in 1994 to be 
replaced by three successor bodies with similar missions. This course of 
events, that had initially been put forward in order to “avoid 
experiments,” ended up as the most radical experiment imaginable.
The outcome of the high-speed privatization process in the former 
13 The most high-profile takeover of an Eastern enterprise by a Western competitor in 
order to “clear the market” was the 1993 fusion of the Eastern “Mitteldeutsche Kali AG” 
with the Western “Kali and Salz AG” that belongs to the BASF industrial conglomerate. 
The post-takeover announcement of the closure of the eastern production site in 
Bischofferode triggered the most visible workers’ protests in the East post-unification. 
25 years after the event, the 2018 documentary movie “Bischofferode – Das Treuhand-
Trauma” concluded that the traumatic experience still remains very much alive in 
the minds of the protagonists. For the movie, see <https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=NYr5rOkT9Nw> (date accessed November 18, 2019).
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GDR was as follows: (1) unprofitable GDR enterprises were quickly 
closed down triggering high levels of unemployment; (2) an extremely 
small number of economically promising GDR enterprises were taken 
over by West German companies (foreign corporate interest was 
generally discouraged by the West German executives of the 
Treuhandanstalt); (3) many Western takeovers occurred in order to “clear 
the market,” i.e. eastern enterprise was subsequently closed down; (4) a 
near full-scale deindustrialization of East Germany occurred; and (5) no 
East German entrepreneurial class emerged due to GDR citizens’ lack of 
initial capital ownership, which collectively made them unable to 
purchase any assets.14
While Chancellor Kohl initially promised “flourishing landscapes,” 
the reality was that East Germany turned into a structurally depressed 
economic emergency zone comparable to other economically 
disadvantaged regions in Europe such as the southern parts of Italy. The 
economic and socio-cultural outcomes were both short-term and long-
term. Post-unification, there was a dramatic collapse in the East German 
fertility rate. At one point in the 1990s, it fell to 0.8, the lowest rate ever 
recorded in a non-city state during peace times. In addition, more and 
more East Germans left their regions in order to find employment and 
life prospects elsewhere. Data covering intra-German mobility between 
East and West shows that more than 3.6 million East Germans (nearly 
one in four) left the East for the West between 1991 and 2017. There were 
also 2.4 million moves in the opposite direction.15 Overall, East Germany 
14 One needs to acknowledge a certain circularity in post-hoc German discussions of GDR 
enterprise privatization. There is agreement that “shock therapy”—the liberalization of 
prices, the introduction of the West German currency, and the cuts in subsidies—triggered 
the collapse of East German industry and resulted in the decline of the Eastern labor 
force from close to ten million in 1989 to barely six million some years later. However, 
opinion differs widely on whether alternative policy choices would have delivered better 
outcomes. See e.g. Helmut Wiesenthal, “German unification and ‘Model Deutschland’: 
An adventure in institutional conservatism,” West European Politics, vol. 26, no. 4 (2003), 
pp. 37-58, and Wolfgang Streeck, Re-Forming Capitalism. Institutional Change in the 
German Political Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 210-16. 
15 Christian Bangel et al., “East-West Exodus: The Millions Who Left,” Zeit Online, May 
30, 2019, <https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2019-05/east-west-exodus-
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experienced a dramatic demographic decline that became structurally 
entrenched due to the tendency of younger and better-educated people 
to leave for good.
The disappointing outcome of the economic transition would have 
resulted in large-scale social upheaval in the absence of side payments to 
placate the situation. In order to manage the socio-economic changeover, 
the existing FRG welfare state and social insurance policies were quickly 
extended to the East. In a memorable phrase, this policy mix was 
described as “shock therapy combined with anti-shock guarantees.”16 
The most significant immediate measure concerned “short hour” work 
payments (Kurzarbeitergeld), which referred to de facto wages for 
workers who were either winding down their own workplaces or were 
actually unemployed. This measure covered at one point around 2 
million people in the East. In addition, early retirement policies for 
workers above the age of 55 (approx. 850,000 people) allowed the older 
generation to withdraw from the labor market for good. This measure 
was a very effective way to silence potential dissenters.17 On the other 
hand, Western employees newly appointed to leadership positions in 
the East were offered generous special allowances to top up their pay 
and to compensate them for their labor mobility.18
migration-east-germany-demography> (date accessed November 18, 2019).
16 Wiesenthal, op. cit., p. 41.
17 Ritter, op. cit., pp. 223-28.
18 Yana Milev, “Was heiβt hier Transformation? Tatbestände der Verwerfung, Abwicklung 
und Löschung in Ostdeutschland seit 1989/90. Zum Forschungsprofil des vorliegenden 
Bandes,” in Entkoppelte Gesellschaft – Ostdeutschland seit 1989/90: TATBESTÄNDE, 
eds. Yana Milev and Franz Schultheis (Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang Verlag, 2019), p. 20. 
This publication is one of nine published or projected monographs on what the main 
initiator Yana Milev terms “the social and cultural disappearances in East Germany since 
1989/90.” Overall, Milev stresses that the “policy of memory” in post-1990 Germany 
mostly excludes East German academics of the age cohort born between 1945 and 1975. 
In addition, she highlights the “devaluation of everyday culture and the cultural heritage 
of the GDR” as an “act of colonial violence.” Her effort to research against the grain is 
enabled by the Zurich University of the Arts and other institutions. It will be interesting 
to observe to what extent her monumental and dissident “Remembrance of Things Past” 
will be recognized as a significant contribution to the “policy of memory” in the German 
media and cultural landscape.
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Post-unification, East Germans were added to the FRG pension 
insurance system. Subsequently, some Eastern retirees received 
relatively high pensions in comparison to West Germans because the 
GDR employment system had allowed male and particularly female 
workers to acquire pension contribution records based on full-time 
work. This sometimes resulted in higher female pensions for Eastern 
women in comparison to their Western compatriots.19 In order to 
manage record unemployment levels among younger and middle-aged 
workers, benefits were paid for participation in state-organized 
employment schemes or retraining measures. These public employment 
policies bought time but failed to create any sustained economic 
recovery due to the low level of private sector investment in Eastern job 
creation. No self-supporting economic upturn occurred, and the 
economic depression in the East became a chronic condition.
On the political plane and with regard to “reconciliation” (or 
absence of it), the major event was the large-scale removal of the former 
GDR elite from positions of influence in the post-1990 Eastern political 
system. Practically all newly created top leadership positions in the East 
were filled with West Germans—and this mostly continues to be the 
case at the moment of writing. This sets East Germany apart from the 
other post-socialist transformation societies in Eastern Europe and the 
post-Soviet space where former elites usually partially retained their 
positions of influence, allowing them to play a significant role under the 
new socio-economic circumstances.
By contrast, East German political, academic, and administrative 
elites were often forced to leave their positions of influence, without any 
clear-cut alternative fields of employment being available. Thus, the 
middle-aged GDR-generation that was fully socialized in the East but 
19 However, introducing the Western pension system in the East also produced new gender 
injustices. In particular, Eastern women who were divorced during GDR times were not 
offered any equalization measures with regard to their pension prospects, although such 
measures had previously been in place in West Germany before 1989 (Lastenausgleich). 
Thus, this particular cohort of Eastern female pensioners suffers from disadvantages 
in comparison to West German women. For more detail on this long-standing policy 
controversy, see <http://www.verein-ddr-geschiedener-frauen.de/index.html> (date 
accessed November 18, 2019).
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too young to retire lost the most in the transformation process. The main 
losers were those with political leadership functions, those in sectors that 
were most decimated due to economic restructuring, and in particular 
female leadership personnel. On the other hand, elites with specialist 
knowledge and a lower degree of political exposure fared comparatively 
better. Yet these groups also faced increasing competition from Western 
elites.20 However, the hardest-hit group overall consisted of rank-and-
file Eastern workers, i.e. the social group that had initially in many cases 
been the loudest proponent in favor of rapid economic transition fell 
victim to that very same process in turn.
Subsequently, the new “post-socialist” East German political class, 
which had only emerged in late 1989 and early 1990 as an alliance 
partner of the Kohl-CDU (or the West-SPD), fell victim to the 
“reappraisal” of the past. It increasingly became apparent that many of 
those now active in higher-level East German politics had previously 
cooperated to some extent with the GDR’s secret police, the Stasi. One 
politician after another saw his or her “Stasi file” (secret police file) 
published. In the early 1990s, this was generally considered sufficient to 
exclude the person in question from further participation in professional 
politics. The fact that many of these files were the result of people being 
pressured to cooperate, in order to qualify for places at university or due 
to workplace conflicts, was not considered as a remedial factor. Due to 
this policy of exclusion of “secret police informants,” most newly-
prominent East German politicians fell by the wayside. Perhaps the only 
prominent politicians still standing with name recognition in the East 
turned out to be Angela Merkel and Vera Wollenberger, the former 
20 Anne Goedicke, “Fachexperten und Leitungskader: Karrieren von Angehörigen der 
oberen Dienstklasse der DDR nach der Wende,” Historical Social Research, vol. 28, 
no. 1/2 (2003), pp. 247-69. For recent analysis of East German underrepresentation 
in leadership positions in German society today, see Ronald Gebauer, Axel Salheiser, 
Lars Vogel, “Bestandsaufnahme Ostdeutscher Eliten 2017,” in Deutsche Gesellschaft 
e. V. [no stated place of publication], ed., Ostdeutsche Eliten: Träume, Wirklichkeiten 
und Perspektiven, pp. 14-33, <https://www.deutsche-gesellschaft-ev.de/images/
veranstaltungen/konferenzen-tagungen/2017-pb-ostdeutsche-eliten/Deutsche_
Gesellschaft_eV_Broschuere_Ostdeutsche_Eliten.pdf> (date accessed November 
18, 2019).
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apparently without any record of previous political activism and the 
latter a prominent victim of Stasi surveillance.
IV. Schröder-Chancellorship 1998-2005
Following the German federal election of 1998, a new center-left 
coalition government of SPD and Green Party entered office at a 
moment in time when high levels of unemployment and concern about 
Germany’s future economic competitiveness in world markets—the 
“globalization shock”—triggered an increasing influence of neoliberal 
ideas in public discourse. This was particularly evident in the pro-
deregulation coverage of economic news on public television and in 
print newspapers, which back then still held a large share of the public’s 
attention. Because of this situation—a left of center government facing a 
neoliberal Zeitgeist—the new administration initially suffered from the 
absence of any clear policy paradigms. Initially, traditional leftists in the 
government demanded more state intervention at the macroeconomic 
level in the German and the European Union (EU) contexts. This policy 
paradigm was advanced by the then German finance minister Oskar 
Lafontaine suggesting investment in public infrastructure, education, 
and research to facilitate economic growth (referred to as Euro-
Keynesianism).21 
A somewhat similar idea—located between policy paradigm and 
policy instrument—was to directly support remaining Eastern 
enterprise. This policy initiative was termed “industrial growth core” (or 
“regional growth core”) and was supposed to bring together Eastern 
firms with regional policy actors, civil society, and universities and 
research bodies in order to facilitate “regional value chains”—by 
retaining a skilled workforce and by strengthening local research and 
development capacities. These activities were generally evaluated to 
21 Jörg Michael Dostal, “From ‘Moderniser’ to ‘Traditionalist’: Oskar Lafontaine and 
German Social Democracy in the 1990s,” Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and 
Eastern Europe, vol. 8, no. 1 (2000), pp. 23-37.
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enjoy a degree of success.22 However, the funding levels for “growth 
core” policies were very modest in comparison to what had been 
destroyed in terms of the break-up of Eastern industrial enterprise 
directly after the economic transition.
Because of the dominance of neoliberal ideas in Germany around 
the end of the millennium, the government of Chancellor Schröder 
dramatically changed course in 1999 and again in 2003. It began 
focusing on consolidating the public budget through austerity measures 
before turning to neoliberal supply-side reform in the labor market and 
retrenchment of the welfare state. Finally, taxes for employers and the 
wealthy were cut while the general sales tax—the least progressive tax—
was increased. Among these measures, the most dramatic policy change 
was the 2003 drastic curtailment of unemployment benefits for the long-
term unemployed (the so-called “Hartz 4 reforms,” named after a 
Volkswagen personnel manager and then personal friend of Schröder). 
This policy shift, which was hitting the high-unemployment East 
German regions the most, produced the second major policy schism 
after unification. Subsequently, large-scale street protests occurred in 
practically all urban centers of Germany. A newly emerging nationwide 
“anti-Hartz movement” started rallying against the retrenchment of 
unemployment insurance. These protests, the largest since the events of 
1989/1990, underlined that significant popular sectors in East and West 
now feared social precarity. Many people, including middle-class 
audiences, felt that the welfare state would not protect them adequately 
in the event of job loss. As a reaction to the extremely unpopular welfare 
cuts, the Social Democrats experienced a collapse in their level of 
electoral support, losing more than half of their former voters. Since 
2003, many working-class sectors and the urban poor have either 
stopped participating in elections or, similar to other European 
22 Sonja Kind, Martina Kauffeld-Monz, Michael Nerger, Daniel Thiele, Jan Wessels, 
Christian von Drachenfels, “Evaluation der Förderinitiative Innovative regionale 
Wachstumskerne im Rahmen der BMBF-Innovationsinitiative für die Neuen Länder 
‘Unternehmen Region,’” (Institut für Innovation und Technik, Berlin, 2016), <https://
vdivde-it.de/de/publikation/evaluation-der-foerderinitiative-innovative-
regionale-wachstumskerne> (date accessed November 18, 2019).
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countries, have switched their allegiance to right-wing populist parties.
In parallel, the leftist opposition party, the PDS, also increasingly 
gained electoral support by assuming the role of advocate of Eastern 
interests and defender of welfare state principles. One core group of SPD 
members deriving from the trade union and social policy wing decided 
to split from the Schröder-SPD in protest against the chancellor’s welfare 
retrenchments and later, in 2007, unified with the PDS to form a new 
political party named “The Left” (Die Linke). Due to this development, 
the PDS ceased to be a predominantly Eastern regional party and also 
gained parliamentary representation in some West German regional 
parliaments. In the East, the PDS represented social milieus that 
considered unification as biased in favor of Western interests. However, 
PDS supporters were not simply protesting: most backing came from 
groups with higher educational levels, sometimes above-average 
earnings, and from public sector employees with managerial 
responsibilities.23 In other words, the PDS enjoyed more support from 
middle-class rather than working-class audiences and continued to 
represent cohorts of the GDR “state class” that had been employed in 
23 Here, the analytical difference between “narrow” and “broad” definitions of “employees 
with managerial responsibilities” (Führungskräfte) is the crucial factor. While the post-
1990 leadership of eastern public sector institutions—ministries, administrative bodies, 
and the legal system—was exclusively recruited from a pool of West German applicants, 
this was not necessarily the case in other sectors such as business or cultural fields. 
Applying a broader definition of employees with “managerial responsibilities,” namely 
one that includes the self-employed, small business leaders, high-ranking public sector, 
and white-collar employees (Angestellte mit Leitungsfunktionen), highlights the fact 
that East Germans still held a significant share of eastern managerial positions. However, 
this group of “lower leaders” also faced severe competition from West Germans. In 
the first 20 years after unification, the eastern share of representation in such eastern 
managerial roles constantly declined while the West German share went up. This helps to 
understand the tendency of eastern “lower leaders” during this period to support the PDS 
(since 2007 “The Left”). See Peter Krause, Jan Goebel, Martin Kroh, Gert G. Wagner, 
“20 Jahre Wiedervereinigung: Wie weit Ost-und Westdeutschland zusammengerückt 
sind,” DIW Berlin Wochenbericht, 44, 2010, p. 4, <https://www.diw.de/documents/
publikationen/73/diw_01.c.363221.de/10-44-1.pdf> (date accessed November 18, 
2019).
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supervisory capacities in the former GDR.24 
In electoral terms, the PDS peaked in 2001, gaining a 48 percent vote 
share in the eastern part of Germany’s capital Berlin (and 23 percent 
across the city), following the former center-right city government’s 
collapse due to corruption scandals. However, this electoral success, 
which allowed the PDS to join a regional coalition government with the 
SPD in Berlin, also proved to be a Pyrrhic victory. In fact, the PDS 
politicians’ support of public housing privatization and cuts in public 
sector wages, which were undertaken in order to balance the regional 
budget, meant that the party lost nearly half of their electoral support in 
the subsequent 2006 elections. Entering government meant that the PDS 
started to become a “normal” party in the sense of disappointing their 
voters in a manner that was comparable with the example of the 
Schröder-SPD.
V. Merkel Chancellorship Since 2005
Due to the unpopular “Hartz reforms,” the “red-green” government 
was voted out of office in early federal elections in 2005. Since then, 
Chancellor Merkel of the center-right CDU has governed Germany in 
“grand coalitions” with the SPD (2005-2009, 2013-2017, and since 2018), 
while there was a single center-right coalition of Christian Democrats 
with the market-liberal FDP party between 2009 and 2013. It is fair to 
stress that the Merkel-led administrations have not focused much on the 
special economic conditions in East Germany. Nor has Merkel’s eastern 
biographical background had any noticeable effect on the conduct of 
public policy. Instead, the government was preoccupied with various 
emergency measures in reaction to the global financial crisis starting in 
2007. In 2008 and 2009, Commerzbank, a major German bank that had 
just taken over Dresdner Bank, another major German bank, asked to be 
bailed out by public emergency funds. After a partial state takeover of 
Commerzbank, subsequent policies of the Merkel government were 
24 Inka Jörs, Postsozialistische Parteien: Polnische SLD und ostdeutsche PDS im Vergleich 
(Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), pp. 79-81.
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dubbed the “banking rescue.” This new-style crisis management by the 
state was soon, in 2010, followed by what was termed the “Greece 
rescue,” which turned into some larger “rescues” of several Euro 
currency member countries experiencing large-scale budget deficits.25 
In reaction to the Greek bailout, intended to avoid a default of 
Greece on its debt mostly held by other euro currency member 
countries, the creditor states, primarily Germany, demanded severe 
austerity measures such as privatizing public enterprise and welfare 
cost-cutting. Subsequently, these measures were also applied in some 
other countries hit by economic crises such as Portugal, Ireland, and 
Spain. The subsequent retrenchment shared features of the earlier East 
German post-unification policies. However, the rather surprising 
outcome of these contradictory activities, principally concerned with 
managing the southern states’ debt problem in a way that avoided short-
term losses for creditors, was the emergence of a new Eurozone policy of 
“monetary Keynesianism.”26 
In particular, in order to avoid a default of southern EU states, the 
European Central Bank introduced zero-interest policies (and, since 
2014, negative interest rates in some instances) that served to allow the 
southern states to continue carrying high nominal debt levels. At the 
same time, creditor countries, namely Germany, experienced economic 
stimulus due to the fact that capital savings became unattractive. The 
zero-interest policies forced savers to invest their capital in assets other 
than government bonds or bank deposits. This triggered rapid stock 
market gains and a housing price bubble, which in turn resulted in a 
25 For a brief summary, see Nicholas Busse, “Kurze Geschichte der Euro-Rettung,” 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 31, 2011, <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/
wirtschaft/konjunktur/euro-krise-kurze-geschichte-der-euro-rettung-11128868.
html> (date accessed November 18, 2019).
26 The term highlights the fact that most economic gains are realized by those investing 
in the stock market or real estate (the so-called asset price inflation). On the other hand, 
cuts in public services and public infrastructure investment might occur in parallel. This 
is certainly true in the case of the southern EU states. Thus, “monetary Keynesianism” 
fundamentally differs from the “Euro-Keynesianism” advanced by traditional social 
democrats at the turn of the millennium and, in fact, might dramatically increase social 
inequality.
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construction boom and an expansion of the real economy.
Turning back to the economic situation in East Germany, the 
policies of the German government since 2007 have produced various 
complementary and overall expansionist outcomes. Directly after the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis, traditional countercyclical policy 
instruments at the national level were reintroduced, namely workers 
received grants from the government in the case of crisis-triggered cuts 
in working hours in order to retain their skills. In addition, a financial 
incentive was introduced for people to purchase new cars and dispose of 
old ones. However, more significant were the subsequent monetary 
stimulus measures deriving from the EU level and sketched in the 
previous paragraph. Finally, German labor unions became more 
assertive in recent years in demanding wage increases that directly 
increased peoples’ purchasing power and stimulated the economy.
Looking specifically at East Germany, it should be acknowledged 
that more recent years have been characterized by some degree of 
structural economic recovery. This was due for two reasons. First, the 
negative feedback from the structural decline in the East had already 
worked itself through the system. It simply could not get any worse any 
longer. The extremely low birth rates after 1990 produced much smaller 
age cohorts in the education system and the labor market, while the 
extremely high levels of outward migration from the East to the West 
(estimated to amount to at least two million former GDR citizens leaving 
the East for good) nominally decreased unemployment in regions that 
had already lost large shares of their economically active population.
Second, the recovery and economic upturn in the East is mostly 
limited to some urban centers and the areas around the national capital 
of Berlin where “regional growth cores” have resulted in the rise of new 
enterprise, although still with rather modest shares of industrial 
employment. These areas have also profited from improvements in 
public infrastructure and the recovery and sometime boom in real estate 
prices. However, since many assets are owned by West Germans or 
foreign investors, this does not necessarily mean that East Germans 
actually share in the economic recovery.
Briefly summing up the Eastern socio-economic situation three 
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decades after unification, all major indicators suggest that there will 
never be any full economic equalization with the West. The economic 
structure in the East continues to be based on small-scale companies, 
while an industry with global competitiveness and research and 
development capacities is largely absent. Employees in the East are 
much less likely to be covered by collective wage setting procedures 
(Tarifbindung) that involve unions and employer associations. In 1998, 76 
percent of western and 63 percent of eastern employees were covered by 
collective wage bargaining, indicating adequate and stable wages, while 
this share had declined in 2018 to 56 percent and 45 percent, 
respectively.27 
In 2018, the productivity of East German workers was still a third 
lower in comparison to West Germans, due to the predominance of 
small companies and lower levels of capital stock per workplace. In 
terms of the intra-German wage gap, Eastern full-time wages 
(Vollzeitentgelte) are currently still around 22 percent lower in 
comparison to Western wages. Moreover, unemployment levels in the 
East remained in mid-2018 with 7.4 percent, substantially higher in 
comparison to the Western level of 5.2 percent, while these levels had 
been at 20.4 percent and 10.8 percent in June 2005 during the peak of the 
post-unification employment crisis.28 Overall, the demographic decline 
in the East has reduced the size of the cohort of people who are of 
working age. On the other hand, the West German labor pool has been 
growing substantially due to sizable intra-German, EU, and global 
migration flows. Partially due to such underlying demographic changes, 
most projections assume that economic differences between the eastern 
and western parts of Germany are likely to once again increase in the 
future.
As for the representation of East Germans in leadership positions in 
the unified country, one inquiry in 2010 highlighted that no top-30 stock 
27 See WSI-Tarifarchiv, <https://www.boeckler.de/wsi-tarifarchiv_2257.htm> (date 
accessed November 18, 2019).
28 Uwe Blien, Van Phan thi Hong, Ludwig von Auer, Sebastian Weinand, “Wächst die Kluft 
zwischen den Regionen?,” IAB Forum, September 4, 2019, <https://www.iab-forum.
de/waechst-die-kluft-zwischen-den-regionen/> (date accessed November 18, 2019).
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market listed German company (DAX-Unternehmen) was led by an East 
German, while only three out of 88 university presidents were from the 
East. Only one out of 213 generals in the armed forces had East German 
roots (a female medical services general).29 In 2019, this situation had not 
changed in any significant manner. According to a former high profile 
East German CDU politician, the Federal Republic does not employ a 
single ambassador of East German origin, while there is also no Eastern 
university president employed in the East. In turn, 80 percent of 
employees in Eastern state ministries are from the West, and similar 
figures also apply to Eastern university personnel. In an appearance on 
an East German TV show, a retired CDU politician argued, to applause 
from the audience, that “this cannot go on, this is against the 
Constitution.”30 To sum up, the prospects of young people born in the 
East after unification to ever gain access to the higher ranks of 
administrative and economic sectors are still lower than those of their 
Western-born fellow citizens.
VI. Evaluating Germany’s Unification Experience Since 1990
In this section, three ideal-typical patterns of policymaking in the 
unification process will be briefly sketched, namely (1) “muddling 
through;” (2) routinization policies that could also be described as 
“reconciliation by accident;” and (3) policy failure in the sense of lasting 
disappointment with the outcomes of unification. As for muddling 
through, the most significant observation is that there never was an 
explicit effort to develop reconciliation policies as a separate field of 
policy-making. Instead, unification was considered as the addition of the 
East to the West in the sense of adapting the former to the latter. This 
was well-put in the spontaneous coinage, in 1990, of the new West 
29 Peter Krause et al., op. cit.
30 These numbers derive from Peter-Michael Diestel, the CDU interior minister of the 
transitional GDR government between March and October 1990, and were voiced on 
MDR television on September 6, 2019, see <https://www.mdr.de/riverboat/riverboat-
gesamt-avplus-590.html> (minutes 30:04-31:02) (date accessed November 18, 2019).
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German word of “Beitrittsgebiet” which means “joining-up area” or 
“accession territory.” This Western term clarified that Easterners had 
joined the West on the understanding that Western rules would apply 
without any further follow-up negotiations between the two sides. As 
already indicated above, unification was considered as a socio-economic 
managerial task, expected to be conducted in a fairly limited period of 
time, and delivering an equalization of living conditions in both parts of 
Germany. Many sections of East German society were, in fact, willing to 
trust the new authorities: “They felt that they did belong to and wished 
for the quickest possible joining-up (Anschluss) with the Federal 
Republic; they extended respect and confidence to the Western state’s 
citizenry.”31 
However, the path-making decisions taken by West German elites at 
the beginning of the process in 1990 have failed to produce many of the 
desired outcomes—especially when judged from the Eastern 
perspective. Thus, recent analysts have correctly stressed that 
“agreement can only be reached between equals” and that “feelings of 
having been cheated” continue to circulate widely in the East.32 
Moreover, the theme of “demographic decline” in Germany’s East, since 
the turn of the millennium, triggers a “deficit-demographic decline-
disaster feedback loop.”33 This conveniently conceals from critical 
analysis the political role of the Treuhandanstalt, which turned Eastern 
public assets into Western-owned private assets. On the other hand, a lot 
of Westerners still believe that Eastern grievances were settled a long 
time ago. “In principle, one does not really know what actually 
happened [in the East] during the 1990s. One knows the buzzwords, but 
it seems a very exhausted topic.”34 Many Westerners also think that they 
31 Wolfgang Engler, Die Ostdeutschen als Avantgarde (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 2000), p. 28.
32 Andreas Willisch, “Über den Osten sprechen: Wege aus der Desaster-Rhetorik,” 
tageszeitung (taz), September 8, 2019, <https://taz.de/Ueber-den-Osten-
sprechen/!5621559/> (date accessed November 18, 2019).
33 Ibid.
34 Anja Maier [Interview with Marcus Böick], “Historiker über die Treuhand: Es gab 
Proteste, Streiks, Drohbriefe,” tageszeitung (taz), July 15, 2018, <https://taz.de/
Historiker-ueber-die-Treuhand/!5517592/> (date accessed November 18, 2019). 
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contributed to the unification process by paying higher taxes and by 
accepting that many state-led public infrastructure activities were 
focusing on the eastern part of the country while the relative quality of 
public infrastructure in the western regions stagnated or experienced 
decline.
Turning to the second category of policy routinization and 
“reconciliation by accident,” one might stress that the rapid transition 
from Eastern to Western political structures succeeded in avoiding a 
“power vacuum.” There was no instance of sustained resistance on the 
part of Eastern elites rejecting the new structures. The East Germans 
were quickly split into different groups of “winners” and “losers” of the 
unification process. For some time, many Easterners were not sure to 
which side they would ultimately belong. Moreover, the emerging 
market economy quickly imposed a new kind of discipline on people’s 
everyday behavior and made them focus on complex new challenges 
concerning (un)employment, social security, and health and safety. This 
was very effective in crowding out efforts by Eastern elites to retain 
institutions of collective self-representation in order to extract 
concessions from West German elites. 
The exception from this general observation was, to the surprise of 
many observers, the political comeback of the PDS as a new kind of East 
German people’s party in the 1990s and again after 2003 due to the 
protests against the welfare retrenchment policies of the Schröder-SPD. 
As a result of this development, a divided party system developed in 
which the “Western” smaller parties, namely the Greens and the Liberals 
(FDP), were much less visible in the East and mostly absent from 
regional parliaments, while the Eastern party system (the one prevalent 
in the five Eastern regional states of the unified country) was 
characterized by three medium-sized parties, the CDU, SPD, and PDS, 
competing for primacy.
In more recent times, since the 2013 foundation of the rightist 
Alternative for Germany (AfD), the party system has again undergone 
major restructuring. The AfD’s foundation was initially advanced by 
those rejecting the Merkel government’s euro currency policies and 
bailout of southern EU countries. Since 2015, however, the AfD has 
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mostly focused on opposing the chancellor’s policy to open Germany’s 
borders for high numbers of refugees and migrants. At present, the AfD 
has gained entry to all 16 regional German parliaments and is also the 
strongest opposition party at the federal level. Initially mostly rooted in 
the West, the AfD’s subsequent rise has been particularly pronounced in 
the East. Many eastern rural areas have turned into AfD electoral 
strongholds, while the party scores below average in eastern urban 
centers that are economically more prosperous.35 The AfD is now the 
second-largest party in terms of electoral support in all of the five 
Eastern regional parliaments. At the same time, levels of support for 
CDU, SPD, and especially the Left Party (former PDS) have all declined 
in recent times, pointing to the emergence of a four-party system in the 
East.
In the past, the German political system demonstrated a remarkable 
ability to integrate “extreme” wing parties. It transformed them over 
time into “normal” parties, in the sense of making them join regional 
and sometimes national coalition governments. This was the case with 
regard to the Greens in the 1980s, the PDS in the 2000s, and it remains to 
be seen whether or not the AfD is going to proceed along a similar 
trajectory. In any case, German political parties and especially their sets 
of professional politicians share interests concerning the current 
generous taxpayer-financed funding for their political work and party-
affiliated educational foundations. This system of party funding, shared 
amongst all parties with a parliamentary presence, has over time 
incorporated the Greens and the PDS (and currently the AfD) into the 
unified Germany’s political system, which points to routinization as a 
process of “reconciliation by accident.”
Finally, there remains the issue of policy failure concerning 
unification. Of course, truth is very much in the eye of the beholder. 
However, it is beyond a reasonable doubt that most East Germans, as a 
group, continue to express less satisfaction and more grievances 
35 Larissa Deppisch, Andreas Klärner, Torsten Osigus, “Ist die AfD in ländlichen Räumen 
besonders erfolgreich?,” (Institut für Demokratie und Zivilgesellschaft, Jena, June 12, 
2019), pp. 83-85, <https://www.idz-jena.de/fileadmin/user_upload/PDFS_WsD5/
Text_Deppisch_Kl%C3%A4rner_Osigus.pdf> (date accessed November 18, 2019). 
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concerning the outcomes of unification. They are also more critical in 
evaluating the current-day policymaking of federal and regional 
governments and the way in which the democratic system in Germany 
functions.36 It is clear that along all crucial dimensions, such as judging 
the economic situation, the degree of equalization of living conditions 
between western and eastern regions, or regarding new major political 
conflicts such as the Merkel government’s handling of the refugee and 
migration issues, East Germans voice higher degrees of dissatisfaction.
Crucially, East Germans, as a group, continue to experience 
structural disadvantages compared to West Germans with regard to 
salary levels and personal wealth, property ownership, and the 
likelihood to inherit wealth. Moreover, they have faced structural 
pressures either to migrate to the West on a permanent basis or to 
regularly commute from eastern to western regions in order to earn a 
living. Some analysts describe East German long-term experiences with 
unification outcomes in terms of “cultural colonialism.”37 They stress 
“biographical devaluation” due to East Germans’ collapse of previous 
social status and social rights, followed by collective discrimination in 
the labor market and the legal system of the unified country. Based on 
longitudinal opinion polls, a cohort of former GDR citizens born 
between 1945 and 1975 is held to have suffered the most severe negative 
long-term consequences of unification, including long-term dislocation 
from the labor market and a high likelihood of facing old age without 
adequate pension provisions.38 
36 Survey questions on satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Germany revealed 
that 49.5 percent of West Germans and 35.6 percent of East Germans stated that they 
were “very satisfied” or “pretty satisfied.” A majority in both parts of Germany stated that 
they were “less satisfied” or “not at all satisfied.” See Frank Decker, Volker Best, Sandra 
Fischer, Anne Küppers, “Vertrauen in Demokratie: Wie zufrieden sind die Menschen in 
Deutschland mit Regierung, Staat und Politik?,” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, 2019, 
pp. 30-32, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/fes/15621-20190822.pdf> (date accessed 
November 18, 2019).
37 Ulrich Busch, “Über Postdemokratie und kulturelle Kolonisierung,” Das Blättchen, 
vol. 22, no. 7 (2019), <https://das-blaettchen.de/2019/03/ueber-postdemokratie-und-
kulturelle-kolonialisierung-47822.html> (date accessed November 18, 2019).
38 Milev, op. cit., pp. 23-31.
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One might conclude that the rapid economic transformation in East 
Germany in the 1990s produced the subsequent decline of the former 
West German “Rhenish capitalism” since the turn of the millennium—
away from its earlier consensus-oriented and welfarist features and 
toward a more market-liberal, deregulated, and politically much less 
stable system.39
VII.  What Policy Lessons Can Be Drawn from the German 
Experience for the Korean Case?
This paper has deliberately sought to avoid mixing up the German 
and Korean cases in the previous sections. Instead, an effort has been 
made to faithfully report various voices on the outcomes of German 
unification from which Korean audiences might draw their own 
conclusions. Each nation is divided (and unified) in its own unique 
ways. Starting with the most obvious point, the geopolitical background 
facilitating Korea’s national division is completely different from the 
German case. In 1989, one of the major external actors, the Soviet Union, 
had entered an existential crisis that was deep enough to trigger the 
decision of (some) Soviet leaders to give up on the results of the outcome 
of the Second World War. To put it in the words of former U.S. Secretary 
of State Condoleezza Rice, “the Soviets were so confused that they no 
longer knew what their interests happened to be.”40 Short of the 
appearance of an East Asian Gorbachev, such a window of opportunity 
39 For changes in the economic structure of German capitalism around the turn of the 
millennium, see Wolfgang Streeck, “Nach dem Korporatismus: Neue Eliten, neue 
Konflikte,” (Working Paper 05/4, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, 
Cologne, 2005) <http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp05-4/wp05-4.html> (date 
accessed November 18, 2019). For recent political repercussions, see Jörg Michael 
Dostal, “The German Federal Election of 2017: How the Wedge Issue of Refugees and 
Migration Took the Shine of Chancellor Merkel and Transformed the Party System,” The 
Political Quarterly, vol. 88, no. 4 (2017), pp. 589-602.
40 Spiegel interview with Condoleezza Rice, “Es ging um den Jackpot,” Der Spiegel, 
September 27, 2010, <https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-73989791.html> (date 
accessed November 18, 2019).
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appears rather unlikely in the Korean context. Some might argue that 
one could always hope that North Korea (the DPRK) might collapse at 
some future point due to internal economic problems or political 
disturbances. Yet these expectations, which were entertained in South 
Korea under the previous presidency of Park Geun-hye, also appear not 
very likely. To paraphrase Rice, countries in the proximity of the DPRK 
might still happen to “know what their interests are.”
Thus, rather than speculating about geopolitical scenarios, it might 
be more useful to reconsider the patient long-term strategy of West 
German politicians, such as Social Democrat Egon Bahr. His initiatives 
were based on the pol icy paradigms of “change through 
rapprochement” and the “policy of small steps.” Since the 1970s, such 
visionary activities helped the two Germanies to first re-engage and then 
remain in close dialogue during all the remaining episodes of the Cold 
War. The intra-German policies also allowed for the reopening of 
cultural flows, thus avoiding further alienation of the two populations 
from each other. In the shadow of the great powers, the two German 
states started engaging in mutual cooperation in the economic field 
while also increasing political dialogue at the elite level. 
From the current South Korean perspective, such policies are still to 
be achieved at some future point. Only patient long-term efforts in this 
respect vis-à-vis the North might deliver substantial outcomes. After all, 
the behavior of the North is mostly determined by tactical 
considerations regarding the country’s interaction with the great 
powers, namely China and the U.S. Moreover, South Korea is also under 
the influence of external actors. All past Southern efforts at inter-Korean 
dialogue followed a cyclical “stop-and-go” and “on-again, off-again” 
pattern. They were quickly interrupted or collapsed altogether “due to 
North Korean provocations.” It must be understood, however, that the 
two Koreas always share a mutual interest to avoid escalation toward 
armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Such a scenario could plausibly 
arise due to external factors and would only deliver large-scale 
destruction to the Korean people on both sides of the border.
What is to be done? First, one should simply acknowledge the deep 
divisions between the two Koreas in all spheres and the degree of 
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alienation that many members of the younger generation in South Korea 
feel when the “national question” is discussed. The much longer period 
of strict separation in comparison to Germany, the extreme differences in 
terms of economic development, and the absence of convenient ways of 
communication across the inter-Korean border—the ability of most East 
Germans to watch West German TV helped them to follow what 
happened on the other side—all constitute objective barriers against 
quick progress.41 One might argue, of course, that South Korean culture 
could potentially exercise a similar “pull” on the imagination of North 
Koreans comparable to the West German media’s role before 1989. 
However, the capacity of South Korean culture to accommodate 
outsiders, including North Koreans, is very much in doubt. In particular, 
the fairly poor South Korean track record with regard to integrating 
refugees from the North suggests that the country is still one of the most 
closed societies in comparison with other OECD democracies.
Thus, raising the attractiveness of the South Korean societal model, 
by expanding welfare provisions and strengthening solidarity, and by 
reorganizing the education system to make it truly inclusive, could 
strengthen the “soft power” of the South in the medium and long term. 
After all, one of the reasons for the good image of West Germany in the 
East pre-1989 was the view that the Western state’s “social market 
economy” had managed to civilize capitalism. By contrast, South 
Korea’s hypercompetitive culture fails to provide incentives to extend 
solidarity to newcomers, and any negative feedback of Northern 
refugees regarding their southern experiences is likely to find its way 
back to Northern publics. One of the easiest ways for South Korea to 
create a better image is to immediately improve the treatment of North 
Korean refugees.
Furthermore, advancing consistent policies of Southern engagement 
with Northern audiences must now become a permanent part of the 
policymaking agenda. This concerns all kinds of inter-Korean 
exchanges, no matter how difficult and no matter how one-sided they 
41 For recent analysis of the economic gap between the two Koreas, see Jong-Wha Lee, 
Warwick J. McKibbin, “Korean Unification: Economic Adjustments under German 
Assumptions,” Asian Economic Policy Review, vol. 14, no. 2 (2019), pp. 262-81.
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might appear at present. Thus, South Korea should make all efforts to 
expand exchanges and engagement and should push hard for it—even 
if the Northern authorities impose many preconditions on such projects. 
Bringing together “epistemic communities” of Northern and Southern 
background, namely from sectors such as the arts, education, and youth 
is the practical meaning of the “policy of small steps” and of “change 
through rapprochement,” as earlier put forward by Egon Bahr and other 
West German politicians. 
The timeframe for such efforts might concern decades to come and 
miracles should not be expected (although they might still occur). To be 
sure, many advocates of traditional “maximum pressure” strategies will 
criticize consistent inter-Korean engagement policies originating from 
the Southern side as a “surrender.” Unfortunately, the current style of 
South Korean politics, based on standoffs rather than dialogue between 
“conservatives” and “liberals,” short-termism, and winner-takes-all 
principles, is a poor framework to deliver consistency in policymaking. 
Yet in reducing the danger of conflict escalation on the Korean 
peninsula, inter-Korean engagement is, in fact, practical and applied 
patriotism. It is reasonable on the grounds that all other strategies are 
worse.
Last, the German case holds many crucial lessons regarding 
reconciliation efforts in the event of Korean unification. Yet these lessons 
will have to be studied only in the unlikely event of basic changes in 
Korea’s geopolitical environment. Thus, the current task is avoiding 
further deterioration first and foremost—rather than to engage in 
wishful thinking. This means keeping inter-Korean channels of 
communication open, no matter how the external context will develop. 
In addition, South Korea must consistently engage with all the external 
stakeholders and veto players in order to preemptively stop any drift 
toward standoffs and mutual war threats.
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